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ESSAY: THE BLESSINGS AND CURSES
OF PIECEMEAL REFORM
Thad Kousser*
Although many expected 2010 to be the year of comprehensive
constitutional change in California, plans for calling a constitutional
convention in the state collapsed. Instead, interest groups and
legislators—whose goals were disjointed and often diametrically
opposed—worked to pass five separate “piecemeal reforms” amending
the constitution. This Essay examines the process of piecemeal reform,
drawing on California history, jurisprudence in the state, and the
experiences of other states to lay out the benefits as well as the costs of
this approach to constitutional change. It concludes by suggesting an
alternative approach to reform that seeks to capture the blessings while
avoiding the curses of the piecemeal process.

* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2010 was supposed to be the year of comprehensive
constitutional reform 1 in California. With influential columnist Dan
Walters calling the state “ungovernable” 2 and former state librarian
Kevin Starr warning that California might become the “first failed
state in America,” 3 the magnitude of California’s constitutional crisis
seemed to necessitate a far-reaching revision of its governing plan. A
majority of voters favored making “fundamental changes” to the
constitution. 4 The Repair California campaign, an outgrowth of the
prominent business group called the Bay Area Council, held a series
of well-attended town hall meetings across the state throughout 2009.
It also proposed a concrete plan to place a call for a citizens’
constitutional convention on the November 2010 ballot. 5 The
convention call was backed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger,
endorsed by reform groups such as Common Cause, and
enthusiastically embraced by the state’s major newspapers. 6 This
1. I use the term “reform” here in the neutral fashion often employed by political scientists.
Abandoning the hope that every well-intentioned reform will bring positive effects, but refraining
from placing “reform” in quotation marks to signify the belief that all attempts at governmental
progress are hopeless, I simply use “constitutional reform” to indicate any proposed change of
electoral and governing structures.
2. For but one example of the enunciation of this verdict, see Dan Walters, Candidates’
Promises Defy Reality, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 13, 2010, at A3.
3. Starr is quoted in Paul Harris, Will California Become America’s First Failed State?,
OBSERVER (London), Oct. 4, 2009, at 32, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/04/
california-failing-state-debt (quoting Kevin Starr).
4. CAL. OP. INDEX, A DIGEST SUMMARY CALIFORNIA VOTERS OPINION ABOUT STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND RELATED ISSUES 1 (2009), available at http://www.field.com/
fieldpollonline/subscribers/COI-09-Oct-CA-Constitution-Reform.pdf. The October 2009 Field
Poll, jointly designed by the Field Poll and a group of academics at Stanford, U.C. Berkeley, U.C.
San Diego, and CSU Sacramento (including the author) asked a random sample of 1,005
registered voters in California a series of twenty questions regarding constitutional reform. When
they were asked “Do fundamental changes need to be made to the state constitution or are
fundamental changes not needed?,” 51 percent of respondents said changes needed to be made,
38 percent said fundamental changes were not needed, and 11 percent were undecided or had no
opinion. See CAL. OP. INDEX, supra. Unless otherwise noted, the public opinion data cited below
draws on this survey.
5. Press Release, Repair Cal., California Constitutional Convention Campaign Put On Hold
(Feb. 12, 2010) (on file with author); California Constitutional Convention, REPAIR CAL.,
http://www.repaircalifornia.org/about_california_convention.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
6. John Grubb, Californians Have the Opportunity to Fix State, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2010,
at E2 (discussing the state’s major newspapers’ positive response to the idea of having a
constitutional convention); George Skelton, Gov. Gets Second Wind as a Reformer, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2009, at B1 (“Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger says he ‘absolutely’ loves the idea of
holding a constitutional convention to overhaul state government.”); California’s Constitution—
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appeared to be Californians’ golden opportunity to revamp the
political structure of the Golden State in a coordinated, wide-ranging
leap of reform. Yet the campaign for a convention collapsed as
quickly as it rose. Repair California generated grassroots excitement,
but failed to generate the money necessary to gather enough
signatures to reach the ballot or the funds to run a serious statewide
campaign. By February 2010, it abandoned its proposal for
comprehensive change. The state will instead be taking small steps,
if any, toward change.
A series of propositions that aim at making piecemeal reform
soon filled the void that this collapse left in the state’s constitutional
conversation. A collection of five initiative constitutional
amendments (ICAs) appeared on the November 2010 ballot. Backed
by more narrow interests and often in conflict with one another, these
piecemeal reforms addressed issues ranging from the voting
thresholds required for passing budgets or raising fees to the
redistricting process to the protection of city finances from state
raids. Amendments that would alter legislative term limits and
restructure the state’s budget process appear to be headed to the
ballot in 2012. 7 More of the ideas backed by California Forward, the
cautious reform group that outlasted the incandescent Repair
California, may appear in future elections. The sum of all of their
parts could bring change as profound as what might emerge from a
constitutional convention, but the prospects for passage of any one of
them is far from certain. Is this any way to rewrite a constitution?
Many observers complain that it is not, bemoaning the lost
opportunity to make changes commensurate with the magnitude of
the state’s challenges. 8 Others voice their concern with the role that
moneyed interests play in pushing piecemeal changes designed for
Time For Overhaul, Common Sense, CAL. COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/site/
pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=5288637 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (“The Board of California
Common Cause has voted unanimously to support the call for a California Constitutional
Convention.”).
7. For analysis of pending propositions and previews of future reforms, see Ballot
Measures, CALIFORNIACHOICES.ORG, http://californiachoices.org/ballot-measures-2010-11 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2010).
8. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 26 (2d ed. 2008) (“Piecemeal reforms . . . are
politically tempting because they create the impression that a single solution can resolve a
complex problem. However, the complexity and diversity of the current problems . . . require a
broader set of reforms.”).
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their authors’ advantage onto the ballot. 9 Such complaints are not
new: observers have long been dissatisfied with the state’s halting
history of reform. In their thoughtful critique of the history of
constitutional reform in California, Joe Mathews and Mark Paul see
the series of half-steps in the past creating a “[n]ew mess built upon
old mess.” 10
Is the piecemeal path down which our state is currently headed a
dead end, or can it lead to lasting and rational reform? This Essay
analyzes the blessings and curses of piecemeal reform through the
lenses of constitutional law, political science, and comparative
historical study. It is grounded in the specifics of California
institutions, legal doctrine, and today’s public opinion but yields
lessons that may apply to reform more generally. At any rate, the
analysis moves beyond the here and now by taking its lessons from
other states and from other eras of California’s history.
I begin by laying out the three routes that can lead to
constitutional change in California: calling a constitutional
convention; crafting legislative reform; and, in the piecemeal
approach, placing a constitutional amendment on the ballot. First, I
review the basic steps in each path, the legal constraints placed on
them, and the political dynamics that shape their eventual outcomes.
Comparing the processes at the beginning facilitates a later
discussion of what might be lost or gained by taking one particular
route.
Then, I focus on the current piecemeal approach, laying out the
blessings that this much-maligned process can bring. It can make a
venerable constitutional law theory—“Brandeisian experimentation”—a reality. One-at-a-time reforms may solve the political
problem that has doomed many comprehensive conventions in other
states and in California’s other eras: their proposed reforms fail at the
ballot box when they are brought down by the least popular part of
their package. Polling evidence shows that California’s proposed
constitutional convention was vulnerable to that fate. 11 By contrast,
the piecemeal approach gives voters a menu of constitutional options

9. See id. at 14–15.
10. See JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE THE
GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 18 (2010).
11. See,e.g., infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
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to pick and choose from as they please. It also avoids opening up the
Pandora’s box of tenuously related issues such as immigration and
same-sex marriage which many Californians view as fair game in a
convention and which drives voter opinion on many rules of
government.
Yet there are plentiful reasons to be concerned about piecemeal
reform. One of the curses is simply that legal doctrine limits the
scope of constitutional change through the initiative process,
although that doctrine has been interpreted in ways that rarely
constrain constitutional change in California. Another worry is that
reforms authored by warring factions may clash and distort each
other’s effects. In contrast, a comprehensive approach allows
constitutional designers to take seriously political science findings
that institutional changes are by nature complex. One of their
unintended consequences might be that the interaction between two
reforms alters the effects of each. Further, the realities of funding
propositions in the state today present a catch-22 for reformers: it is
more difficult to find funding for broad, general-interest reform
efforts than for narrow proposals, but when those narrow proposals
qualify for the ballot, they fare poorly with voters, who see them as
helping a single interest. Finally, the record of tight margins of
victory for many major piecemeal reforms raises concerns about a
razor’s-edge majority imposing rules on a voting minority that often
contains many of California’s racial- and ethnic-minority voters.
To conclude, I present another potential path to reform—a series
of bipartisan, single-subject logrolls—that seeks to capture the
blessings while avoiding the curses of the piecemeal approach. I
provide examples of three such logrolls that could make significant,
ideologically balanced changes to California’s constitution.
II. THREE ROUTES TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The process of constitutional change in California can begin in any
of three ways. These distinct avenues to reform can be pursued
separately or simultaneously. First, legislators (or perhaps voters) can
call a constitutional convention, a gathering of delegates who could
present a wide-ranging set of proposals. Second, legislators—acting,
if they like, on the recommendations of a constitutional revision
commission that they have appointed—may propose major changes
to the constitution. Both of these processes can be used to offer
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“revisions” to the constitution, making fundamental changes to the
state’s governing structure. More limited changes to the constitution
can be made in the third piecemeal process: legislators themselves or
citizen groups can author constitutional “amendments.”
I emphasize the key difference between a revision and an
amendment. This distinction has been drawn by the California
Supreme Court since 1894. 12 A revision brings “changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan” 13 or a “far-reaching change in
our governmental framework.” 14 While often a matter of contentious
judicial interpretation, 15 the line between a revision and amendment
is what divides wholesale from piecemeal reform.
Most importantly, no matter where change originates, voters are
the final arbiters, as a majority of voters must approve the products
of each process at a statewide election. This roadblock stands in the
way of each avenue to reform, making political calculations
paramount for those with serious interests in successful reform. My
comparison of these processes keeps in mind the electoral forces that
bear on all three processes. Each path also faces its own practical and
legal constraints, which I point out briefly in the following sections.
A. Route #1: Calling a Constitutional Convention
The most obvious path toward rewriting a constitution, calling a
convention, can also be the most complicated and politically
perilous. Currently, California’s constitution sets forth a clear
convention process. 16 With a two-thirds vote in each house, state
legislators can ask voters to call a convention. If a majority of voters
at the next statewide general election support this call, the legislature
has six months to provide for a convention and elect delegates from
districts of equal population.
Despite the apparent simplicity of these provisions and the
Golden State’s near-constant appetite for reform, California has only
held one convention (in 1878–79) since drafting its original
12. See Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894).
13. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281,
1286 (Cal. 1978).
14. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990).
15. See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1539 (2009).
16. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
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constitution in 1849. 17 This convention has variously been described
as “the greatest civic disaster” 18 and as a distinctively Western
document that “expanded the purview of state government, creating
new laws and institutions.” 19 Despite receiving criticism for its lack
of delegate diversity and the anti-immigrant policies it advanced, the
1878–79 convention did include important gains for labor and result
in a new constitution passed by the voters. 20 More telling is the
difficulty that elected leaders and reformers have had in bringing
their subsequent calls for a convention to fruition. Four successive
times—in 1898, 1914, 1928, and 1930—voters rejected calls for a
convention that the legislature had placed on ballots. 21 When the
voters finally supported a convention call as one of twenty-three
propositions that appeared on the 1934 ballot, the legislature then
failed to fund and convene it. 22 Since that time, reform advocates
have not secured the necessary two-thirds majority in each house to
put a convention call before the voters. 23
Stymied in the legislature, the reform advocates who began
Repair California in 2009 held a series of town hall meetings across
the state to push for a ballot measure giving citizens the right to call a
constitutional convention. 24 They crafted an ICA granting this right
and began a drive to gather signatures to place it on the November
2010 ballot. 25 At the same time, they gathered signatures to qualify
an initiative that would issue that call, convening a group of 464
delegates selected partially through appointments made by local
government and partially by bringing randomly selected citizens

17. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 10, at 51; A Brief History of the California Constitution,
REPAIR CAL., http://www.repaircalifornia.org/about_california_convention_cahistory.php (last
visited Oct. 20, 2010); see CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 8, at 37.
18. See MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 10, at 22.
19. Amy Bridges, Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the
Western States, STUD. AM. POL. DEV., Spring 2008, at 58.
20. Calling
a
Constitutional
Convention,
CALIFORNIACHOICES.ORG,
http://www.californiachoices.org/node/148 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
21. Id.
22. Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, 3 CAL. POL’Y SEMINAR 2–3
(1991).
23. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 8, at 209.
24. California Constitutional Convention, supra note 5.
25. Mike Aldax, State Seeking Conventional Wisdom on Constitution, S.F. EXAMINER
(Nov. 27, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/State-seeking-conventionalwisdom-on-constitution-76349807.html.
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together to elect some of their own as delegates. 26 The Los Angeles
Times 27 and other major newspapers backed this approach, but
constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky criticized it. 28
The constitutionality of both measures was in doubt because the
first may have constituted a constitutional revision impermissibly
made through the amendment process, and the second may have run
afoul of Voting Rights Act provisions. 29 Yet the constitutionality of
the measures was never tested. Repair California’s signature drive
was crippled from the start: it faced a boycott from Sacramento’s
major signature-gathering firms, which feared that a convention
might lead to restrictions on direct democracy, which would be bad
for their businesses. 30 In any case, Repair California failed to raise
sufficient funds from the members of the Bay Area Council, the
business group that had spawned it, and abandoned its ballot drive in
the spring of 2010.
Regardless of how a convention is called, it brings with it many
potential benefits, while also posing challenging questions. 31 A
convention would create a deliberative, transparent process that
enables comprehensive reform. It would be open to public scrutiny,
and the debate would force delegates to assemble a solid coalition
behind any proposed change. The proposals that convention
delegates made would not be limited by the single-subject rule that
applies to piecemeal reform, as I later discuss, nor would the
delegates be limited to amending rather than revising the

26. Id.
27. Editorial, A Plan That Works: Ballot Measures Proposed by Repair California to Set Up
a Constitutional Convention Deserve Support, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A25.
28. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., The Wrong Fix for California, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2009,
at A27.
29. Video on Demand: Getting to Reform: Avenues to Constitutional Change in
California—Comparing Avenues to Reform: Initiatives, Revision Commission, or Convention
(The California Channel 2009), available at http://www.calchannel.com/channel/viewvideo/772
(highlighting a debate between panelists Pamela S. Karlan of Stanford Law School, Christopher
S. Elmendorf of the University of California, Davis, School of Law, and Richard Temple
regarding the constitutional merits of the Repair California proposals).
30. John Diaz, A Sign of State’s Dysfunction, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 21, 2010, at E6; Lisa
Vorderbrueggen, Ballot Advocates Cry Foul: State Constitutional Convention Group Eyes
Lawsuit, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at 1A.
31. For a thorough discussion of state constitutional conventions, see the authoritative works
of JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006) and G. ALAN
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998).
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constitution. A convention would also likely spark a larger civic
debate about reform issues.
But calling a convention would also force Californians to
grapple with an unfamiliar set of questions. Who should the
delegates be, and would their proposals reflect what Californians
want? Should the districts for delegates (or random selection
mechanisms) count all California residents equally, or be restricted to
legal residents or to voters? Might a convention veer away from
governmental reform into the many policy areas covered by our
current constitution, which addresses social issues such as same-sex
marriage and contains entire articles on motor vehicle revenues and
usury? With over a century gone by since California’s last
experiment with a convention, another trial would certainly bring
unanticipated challenges in its implementation.
Success, of course, is not guaranteed to the product of the
convention’s labor. Delegates could propose a wholly new
constitution, a package of revisions, or a series of separate revisions,
but each would need to garner majority support in a statewide
election. A nationwide study shows that, since 1930, there have been
not only thirty-five successful conventions but also twenty-seven 27
failures that did not lead to any voter-approved reforms. 32 Would
California’s convention propose popular reforms, as Illinois’s did in
1970, 33 or become mired in the pitfalls that doomed New York’s
1967 attempt? 34
B. Route #2: Revision Through the Legislature
The second route to comprehensive revision goes directly
through the legislature. With two-thirds votes in both the state
assembly and the senate—and without consulting the governor—
members of the legislature may place a revision on the ballot for

32. Vladimir Kogan, Lessons from Recent State Constitutional Conventions, CAL. J. POL. &
POL’Y, Jan. 2010, at 5.
33. REPAIR
CAL.,
1970
ILLINOIS
STATE
CONSTITUTION,
available
at
http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/Illinois.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2010); Calling a
Constitutional Convention, supra note 20.
34. Peter Galie, Professor, Canisius Coll., Remarks at the Getting to Reform Conference:
Avenues to Constitutional Change in California (Oct. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.californiachoices.org/sites/californiachoices/files/New%20York%201967.pdf;
Calling a Constitutional Convention, supra note 20.
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voter approval. 35 Revisions may be crafted through either of two
deliberative processes. Lawmakers have the option of convening a
panel of experts, known as a constitutional revision commission, to
review the state’s current constitutional structure and recommend
changes. Or they may simply delegate the task to a committee of
their own members, as both houses did when they each created a
Select Committee on Improving State Government in 2009 to
consider reform measures. 36 Any proposal authored by a commission
or a committee that receives two-thirds votes will be placed before
voters at the next statewide election, where it must receive a simple
majority of the vote in order to pass.
The fact that the 2009–10 session, held during a time of widely
declared constitutional crisis, failed to produce a proposed revision
(though it did generate two proposed amendments) demonstrates the
political challenge that the two-thirds-vote requirement poses to this
process. Because no single party has controlled the necessary
supermajority in recent decades, constitutional reform requires a
bipartisan deal. This has become increasingly difficult as voters and
legislators in California have polarized along partisan lines and as the
widening ideological chasm between the parties makes cross-party
compromises less frequent. 37 On the other hand, in the rare case that
a revision attracts support from members of both parties, its
bipartisan nature and endorsements bode well for its chances at the
ballot box.
This dynamic is illustrated by the pattern of mixed success by
the two constitutional revision commissions convened by the
legislature over the past half-century. In 1963, the legislature
launched a revision commission that, over the next decade,
shepherded through major changes to the state constitution. 38 For
example, the commission’s work greatly trimmed the length of the
35. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
36. Press Release, Cal. State Assembly Democratic Caucus, Steinberg, Bass Appoint
Assembly and Senate Select Committees on Improving State Government (Sept. 3, 2009),
available
at
http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/Issues/California_Reform/Press/
20090903PR01.aspx.
37. Thad Kousser, Does Partisan Polarization Lead to Policy Gridlock in California?, CAL.
J. POL. & POL’Y, Jan. 2010, at 1, 19; Seth E. Masket, It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative
Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849–2006, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 482,
482–83 (2007).
38. See Lee, supra note 22, at 4–7.

580

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:569

constitution and resulted in the creation of a professional, full-time
state legislature. The ballot argument for the commission’s 1966
Proposition 1A was signed by both gubernatorial candidates that
year, Ronald Reagan and Pat Brown, and its bipartisan support
helped it to pass by a three-to-one margin. 39 However, the revision
commission had more trouble finding common ground on ways to
reform the state’s initiative process, where a conflict between
business leaders and reformers stopped major changes to direct
democracy from emerging from the legislature in the 1960s. 40
In the face of a recession-induced public fiscal crisis in the early
1990s, the legislature convened another revision commission to
recommend major reforms to the state constitution. After eighteen
months of deliberations, the commission issued its final
recommendations, 41 calling for broad changes to the state charter:
lengthening legislative term limits, requiring the governor and
lieutenant governor to run on the same ticket, and making certain
elected posts—including the state treasurer and insurance
commissioner—governor-appointed. 42 By the time the commission
issued its recommendations in 1996, however, the economy had
rebounded and the crisis in state politics had receded. The legislature
showed little interest in constitutional reforms, choosing not to vote
on the commission’s recommendations.
Though it has more recent precedent, the commission approach
shares many of the advantages as well as some of the drawbacks of a
convention. Because revisions may be made through this process, it
allows for fundamental changes to the state’s governmental structure
and operations. In addition, it permits public deliberation by a
representative body and allows the experts—who are most familiar
with various constitutional alternatives and their likely
consequences—to propose reforms. Yet, because of this, critics point
to the inherent conflict of interest in entrusting reform of a political
system to the elected officials (or their appointees) who have thrived
39. THAD KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS AND THE DISMANTLING OF LEGISLATIVE
PROFESSIONALISM 13 (2005); Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, A History Lesson on Part-Time Lawmaking,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, at A2.
40. See A Brief History of the California Constitution, supra note 17.
41. CAL. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 2 (1996).
42. Id. at 3–4.
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under it. 43 Because legislative amendments and revisions require
two-thirds of lawmakers to agree on any changes before presenting
them to voters, a small minority of elected officials can block
changes that many Californians might find appealing. The deals that
emerge from the legislature must by the nature of this process
include compromises, and though this elite agreement gives them a
good chance at ultimate passage, it does not guarantee their mass
appeal.
C. Route #3: Amending the Constitution in Piecemeal Fashion
Instead of revising the constitution through a deliberative
process, reformers could seek piecemeal amendments. Such
amendments can begin in one of two ways. They may be placed on
the ballot by legislators through a two-thirds vote in each house, as
happened with the successful Proposition 14 44 and the unsuccessful
Proposition 15. 45 Legislators need not deliberate over these
amendments, and, in fact, Proposition 14 reached the ballot—and
later the constitution—as a concession made by Senator Abel
Maldonado to a swing voter on an important budget deal. 46 The other
path to piecemeal reform is the ICA, which can be authored by any
average citizen possessing the resources to gather signatures equal in
number to 8 percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial race. 47 In
2010, an ICA required 694,354 valid signatures. 48 The scale of this
endeavor requires the use of paid signature-gathering firms that

43. This criticism most often refers to the conflict of interest in redistricting, but legislators
have also been far more reticent than voters to impose term limits and campaign finance
regulations on themselves. See KOUSSER, supra note 39, at 12–14; John Pippen et al., Election
Reform and Direct Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulations in the American States, 30 AM.
POL. RES. 559, 559–60 (2002).
44. California Proposition 14 is now codified at CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 5–6.
45. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 2,
2010: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 66–75 (2010) available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/
vig2010/general/pdf/english/complete-vig.pdf; Jill Stewart, Proposition 15 Fails Miserably
Because California Voters Can’t Stomach Paying to Elect Jerks, LA WKLY. BLOGS (June 9,
2010, 10:16 AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/election/prop-15-campaign-finance-fails/.
46. Bob Egelko, Open Primary Proposition Survives First Legal Challenge, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 15, 2010, at C1.
47. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a)–(b).
48. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, FEBRUARY 5, 2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION—
STATEMENT OF VOTE 19 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_primary/
17_initiative_ref_qual.pdf (noting the Initiative and Referendum Qualification Requirements for
2007–2010).
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charge $1–3 per signature, many of which turn out to be invalid. 49
Initiative campaigns thus typically submit 1.1 million signatures,
making the effective cost of entry into this path of “citizen” reform at
least $2 million. 50
Though it is costly, this path poses fewer barriers than other
routes to reform since no political bargains are necessary. Any
organized group with the resources to qualify an initiative can write
the text as it pleases, dictating the terms of a bargain that they set
before voters and, if the initiative is successful, reaping the rewards
of their power to set the agenda. 51 For well-funded groups, this
power is worth the price. The ballot for the California General
Election on November 2, 2010, featured five ICAs, which qualified
through ballot drives funded by unions; 52 the California League of
Cities and other local government organizations; 53 business
associations and taxpayer rights groups; 54 the independently wealthy
Charles T. Munger, Jr.; 55 and an alliance between congressional
candidates and the former Mighty Morphin Power Rangers producer

49. John M. de Figueiredo et al., Financing Direct Democracy: Revisiting the Research on
Campaign Spending and Citizen Initiatives 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16356, 2010) (“With only 150 days to collect these names, nearly all initiative authors pay
signature gathering firms $1–3 per name to collect the requisite number of valid names.”); see
Initiative Fraud, BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CENTER, http://www.ballot.org/pages/
signature_fraud/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (noting that signature-gathering firms “use an array of
tactics, such as forgery, in order to falsely qualify an initiative onto the ballot”).
50. See John Howard, The Death of Reform in the Capitol?: Absent Cash, Initiatives’
Outlook Is Bleak, CAPITOL WKLY. (Sacramento), Feb. 4, 2010, at A1 (noting that California
campaigns typically require millions of dollars to gather enough signatures to qualify an initiative
and that proponents of California initiatives commonly turn in a surplus of signatures to ensure
that they have a sufficient number); Matthew Yi, Effort Heats Up to Ban Same-Sex Marriage:
Signatures Submitted for Ballot Measure, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2008, at A1 (noting that in the
battle over same-sex marriage, supporters of an initiative to ban it gathered over 1.1 million
signatures in an effort to qualify on the November ballot); de Figueiredo et al., supra note 49, at 6
(discussing how signature-gathering firms charge between $1 and $3 per signature).
51. See Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled
Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 27–28 (1978).
52. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 45, at 52–55 (describing Proposition 25’s elimination
of the two-thirds-vote requirement to pass a budget).
53. Id. at 30–37 (describing Proposition 22’s protection of local government finances from
state revenue declines).
54. Id. at 56–61 (describing Proposition 26’s requirement that extraordinary fees must be
passed by a two-thirds vote).
55. Id. at 18–23 (describing Proposition 20’s expansion of the independent redistricting
commission’s scope to cover congressional districts).
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Haim Saban. 56 An analysis of campaign contributions to ballot
measures in California from 1976 to 2004 shows that propositions
that promised to benefit a particular industry or small group of
citizens raised more money than measures that bring wider
benefits. 57 Such funds helped these industries and groups of citizens
at the ballot box. 58 The economics of financing direct democracy in
modern California play a clear role in shaping the fortunes of
piecemeal reforms.
Legal doctrine also places nominal constraints on how
amendments—whether they are authored by legislators or by
citizens—can change California’s constitution. Amendments can be
challenged if the changes they propose could be construed as so
fundamental to the state’s governing plan that they constitute a
revision or address more than a single subject. Yet, these constraints,
as I argue in a later section on the curses of piecemeal reform, have
not been interpreted in ways that prevent significant reforms.
California’s governing plan has undergone fundamental changes
through upheld amendments, thus pointing out the potency of
piecemeal reform.
III. THE BLESSINGS OF PIECEMEAL REFORM
Because it provides the opportunity for major change and puts in
place fewer obstacles than other routes, the piecemeal approach has
become the most-trafficked avenue to constitutional change in
California. It has been utilized by reform groups such as California
Forward, the League of Women Voters, and California Common
Cause—members of the coalition that successfully created the state’s
independent redistricting commission through Proposition 11 in
2008—as well as unions, anti-tax groups, members of Congress, and
cities pushing amendments on the November 2010 ballot. 59 What are
the advantages that this route promises?

56. Shane Goldmacher, Competing Propositions Take Aim at California Redistricting, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/29/local/la-me-redistricting-20101029
(noting Proposition 27’s elimination of the independent redistricting commission); CAL. SEC’Y OF
STATE, supra note 45, at 62.
57. See de Figueiredo et al., supra note 49.
58. See id.
59. The Ungovernable State: As California Ceases to Function Like a Sensible State, a New
Constitution Looks Both Necessary and Likely, ECONOMIST, May 14, 2009, at 80; L.A. CNTY.
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A. Making Brandeis’s Theory of Laboratories for
Experimentation a Reality
In the 1932 case New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 60 Justice Louis
Brandeis offered one of the most powerful and oft-quoted
justifications for America’s fragmented, often competitive 61 system
of federalism: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.” 62
An important political science literature shows that states do
indeed experiment with innovative policies and that these policies
often diffuse around the country in predictable patterns. 63 However,
the spread of innovative experiments does not always follow the
laboratory model that Justice Brandeis set forth. A happy, scientific
form of federalism might work through logical stages. Courageous
states could make varied attempts at resolving common policy
challenges, then observe and evaluate the effects of innovative
policies. Successful innovations could be replicated in other states
and on the national level, while failed policies could be abandoned.
Instead of finding evidence of this laboratory model, the
empirical record shows that innovations often spread across the
country before they can be evaluated. Their replication has more to
do with political opportunities 64 and the presence of policy
entrepreneurs 65 than with sound judgments of policy effects and
replication of the most successful experiments. This is true in policy

BUS. FED’N, NOV. 2010 BALLOT MEASURES 1–6 (2010), available at http://www.bizfed.org/files/
Nov2010Measures_0.pdf.
60. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
61. For a discussion of competitive federalism and its relationship to policy innovation and
diffusion across the states, see SAMUEL KERNELL ET AL., THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
119–21 (4th ed. 2009).
62. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311.
63. See Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969); see also Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174 (1973) (exploring the diffusion of innovation in the states in the areas of
education, welfare, and civil rights).
64. See Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing
on Political Opportunity, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715 (1992).
65. See Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 738 (1997).
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realms from lotteries to school choice 66 and extends to government
reforms, such as legislative term limits. 67 Twenty states adopted term
limits from 1990 to 1996, before term limits first went into effect in
California and Maine after the 1996 elections. 68 Wherever political
institutions and voter sentiment gave term limits a good chance of
passage, the organized groups that supported term limits pushed for
them without waiting for practical experience or any other evaluation
of their effects. 69
The piecemeal approach to reform provides an opportunity to
follow Brandeis’s model by moving incrementally, guided by
evaluations of effects (though it makes no guarantees that this will in
fact be the course of reform). Instead of embarking on a
comprehensive course toward solving all of the state’s problems at
once, California reformers could take discrete steps, study their
effects, and judge better what remains to be done. A decade-long
program of constitutional change could give policymakers,
reformers, academics, and voters a better chance to experiment,
evaluate, and act on evidence than a headlong move towards a new
constitution could.
The state’s recent reform agenda provides a clear example of
actions that could be better informed by following Brandeis’s model.
The independent redistricting commission created by California’s
2008 Proposition 11 has yet to be finalized, meet, or draw a single
state legislative district. 70 Still, the November 2010 ballot contained
both an ICA that would expand the authority of this commission to
redistrict Congressional seats as well as those for the state
legislature 71 and an ICA that would eliminate the commission
altogether. 72 Both appeared to be premature attempts to replicate or
abandon a reform experiment before it could be evaluated. Instead of
66. Berry & Berry, supra note 64, at 716–17; see id. at 741–42.
67. See Rick Farmer & John C. Green, Introduction: Accelerating Change with Term Limits,
in LEGISLATING WITHOUT EXPERIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN STATE LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS 1,
1–4 (Rick Farmer et al. eds., 2007).
68. See id. at 3; Clifton McCleskey, Term Limits: Should Virginia Follow Suit, VA. ISSUES
& ANSWERS: PUB. POL’Y. F. (Nov. 1997), http://www.via.vt.edu/fall97/termlimit.html.
69. KOUSSER, supra note 39, at 7–12.
70. See Gerry Shih, Tackling Redistricting with Money and Zeal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010,
at A21.
71. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 45, at 18–23.
72. Id. at 62–67.

586

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:569

attempting to fix California’s redistricting process in one fell swoop,
reformers should move iteratively, observing and judging the new
commission’s impact on state legislative districts before taking on
the next piece of reform.
B. Attempts at Comprehensive Reform Often Must Be
Broken into Pieces to Succeed
A comparative look at other states’ constitutional reform, as well
as California’s historical record, shows that attempts at
comprehensive constitutional reform often fail unless they are broken
into pieces. An analysis of state constitutional conventions shows
that nearly half of those held over the past century have failed and
that taking a modified piecemeal path is a key to success.
Conventions are more likely to succeed when they present voters
with a series of separate proposals rather than with a single omnibus
package. 73 The experiences of two large, politically divided states
comparable to California illustrate this lesson. The omnibus package
of reforms drafted at New York’s constitutional convention in 1967
included changes ranging from executive reorganization to the
environment and from consumer protection to the elimination of the
Blaine Amendment (which prohibited government aid to religious
schools). 74 Combining all of these contentious measures into a single
package set before voters for an up-or-down vote doomed the
attempt at reform. Social divisions tore apart the coalition behind the
package, and it failed at the ballot box by a three-to-one margin. 75
Much more successful was the approach taken by delegates to
the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention, which put a menu of
options before voters. 76 They combined the noncontroversial changes
that they proposed into a single document, but then split apart four
major, contentious issues into separate amendments. 77 Voters could
pick and choose as they pleased, and they ended up passing the

73. See Kogan, supra note 32, at 4.
74. Id.; THE HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF N.Y., THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/pdf/
Library/1967_constitutional_convention.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
75. Galie, supra note 34.
76. Kogan, supra note 32, at 4.
77. Id.; Ann Lousin, The 1970 Illinois Constitution: Has It Made A Difference?, 8 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 571, 578–80 (1988).
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consensus changes while rejecting all four of the controversial
amendments. 78 The lesson for comprehensive reformers from New
York and Illinois is that the least popular part of an omnibus package
can sink it, so dividing difficult proposals into pieces may offer the
best chances of electoral success.
California’s experience with constitutional revision offers a
similar lesson: breaking reform into pieces is more politically
feasible than enacting comprehensive change all at once. The
constitutional revision commission established in the 1960s had
success with Proposition 1A, its first proposal, in 1966. It failed in
1968 with Proposition 1, however, when the commission rolled
reforms to education, local government, utilities, civil service, and
other areas of the constitution into a single package. 79 Prior to the
election the Los Angeles Times editorialized that “the electorate
would have been better served had the proposal been less broad in
scope,” 80 and the measure was soundly defeated. The commissioners
learned their lesson and placed eight separate measures on the ballot
in the primary and general elections in 1970. 81 Five of the measures
passed. 82 California’s revision experience again shows that
successful comprehensive reform is divided into separate slices. So
why not start with piecemeal reform in the first place?
C. Public Opinion Research Reveals Few
Intersecting Sets of Support
One of the reasons that omnibus packages of reform fail, even
when they avoid hot-button social issues, is that supporters of one
reform may be opponents of another. This can be the case among
voters even when reform leaders embrace the entire constitutional
amendment. The set of voters backing an independent redistricting
commission (which would take away power from legislative
78. Ann Lousin, Professor, John Marshall Sch. of Law, Remarks at the Getting to Reform
Conference: The Illinois Experience with Constitutional Revision as It Relates to California in the
Twenty-First Century (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://igs.berkley.edu/events/
reform2010_files/lousin.pdf; see Lousin, supra note 77, at 579–80.
79. Bernard L. Hyink, California Revises Its Constitution, 22 W. POL. Q. 637, 649–51
(1969).
80. Lee, supra note 22, at 6 (recapping the 1968 and 1970 campaigns for constitutional
revision as well).
81. Id. at 6–7.
82. Id.
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Democrats), for instance, may not overlap with the set that supports
reducing the two-thirds vote required to pass a budget (which would
empower legislative Democrats). If this is the case, putting the
reforms into a comprehensive package might doom them together
even if each they could succeed on its own in a piecemeal process.
In fact, voter responses to an October 2009 constitutional reform
Field Poll (“the Poll”) show that very few packages of constitutional
reform yield intersecting sets of support. 83 There was no lack of
appetite for reform among the 1,005 registered voters who responded
to the Poll. 84 When asked whether the state constitution required
“fundamental changes,” 51 percent said yes and 38 percent said no,
apparently opening the door to serious revision. 85 However, while
specific proposals found some support, there was very little
intersection between the backers of multiple measures. For instance,
one “grand bargain” often proposed in California would package
together the elimination of the two-thirds vote required to pass a
budget with a spending cap that would ensure the newly empowered
majority did not break the bank. By itself, the elimination of the twothirds rule had a decent level of support in the Poll, with 43 percent
approving of the change and 52 percent opposing it. 86 The strict
spending cap performed even better, with 48 percent of respondents
in support and 45 percent disapproving. 87
What does the Poll reveal about the prospects for combining the
two ideas into a popular package? A close look at the partisan bases
of support for each reform points out a problem: support for
eliminating the two-thirds rule skewed left, with a majority of
Democrats backing it while Republicans opposed the idea by a
nearly three-to-one margin. 88 By contrast, the strict spending cap
appealed to a majority of Republican voters, while a majority of
Democrats opposed it. 89 This makes assembling the grand bargain in
the electorate difficult. Throwing out undecided respondents, only 18

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See CAL. OP. INDEX, supra note 4, at 1.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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percent of voters supported both of the reforms. 90 A 60 percent
majority was torn, supporting one reform but not the other, and 21
percent opposed both. 91 A campaign in favor of the package would
begin with the allegiance of fewer than one in five voters and face an
uphill battle to persuade Californians to support an omnibus
containing a major reform that they opposed on its own.
Even pairing two reforms that the Poll’s respondents support did
not guarantee success. One of the most popular proposals was
increasing the popular vote needed to approve a constitutional
amendment from a simple majority to a two-thirds supermajority, an
idea supported by a 56 to 36 percent margin and backed by voters
from both major parties as well as independents. 92 Combining this
proposal with the imposition of a spending cap, which also enjoyed
plurality support, did not produce an obvious winner. Only 34
percent of voters backed both measures, while 46 percent supported
only one of them and 20 percent backed neither. 93 Again, the
campaign prospects of a two-pronged package appear dim. The Poll
alone does not reveal whether the electoral fortunes of a package are
lifted up or dragged down by its least popular item—an important
question that could be answered using survey experiments in future
polls—but the Poll painted a bleak picture. There does not seem to
be a stable constituency in favor of any and all reform in the
California electorate, presenting a challenge that bipartisan reform
leaders in groups such as California Forward should carefully
consider.

90.
91.
92.
93.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 4–5.
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D. Avoids the Pandora’s Box of Hot-Button Policies
A final advantage of piecemeal reforms is that they are finite,
static proposals. After an amendment has qualified for the ballot, no
one can take advantage of Californians’ appetite for reform by
placing a rider on a popular amendment that veers away from
governmental affairs into contentious social issues. This is a worry,
by contrast, for a constitutional convention. When Repair
California’s convention call was still a possibility, some worried that
it would open a Pandora’s box of controversial policy battles being
fought out within the constitution. 94 Because California’s governing
document does in fact touch on many policy areas ranging from the
94. See Elise Viebeck, Failed Convention Post-Mortem, CAL WATCHDOG (Mar. 18, 2010),
http://www.calwatchdog.com/2010/03/18/new-failed-convention-post-mortem.
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definition of marriage to the right to fish, these fears were not outside
the realm of possibility. 95
The Poll asked voters whether they thought reform deliberations
should be limited to the operation of government or whether the
debate should also address issues like same-sex marriage and illegal
immigration. 96 By a 59 to 33 percent margin, voters wanted to keep
same-sex marriage out of the debate, but a 48 percent plurality of
voters (over a 41 percent minority) thought that the debate should
address illegal immigration. 97 If convention delegates did see this as
part of their legitimate scope, public divisions on immigration could
have doomed the process. Since voters’ views on immigration appear
to shape their views on constitutional amendments that in no way
impact immigration policy, 98 a convention that included the topic of
immigration would be politically fraught. Vladimir Kogan’s crossstate study of the success of constitutional meetings concluded that
“[c]onventions failed, however, when their proceedings were
hijacked by advocates of large reforms on issues for which there was
little public consensus.” 99 Piecemeal reforms, because they cannot be
hijacked, stand a greater chance of passage.
IV. THE CURSES OF PIECEMEAL REFORM
A. Amendments Are Constrained by Single-Subject
and Revision Doctrines
The most obvious disadvantage of piecemeal reform is that oneby-one amendments ostensibly cannot bring changes as profound as
those that might emerge from a convention or a revision commission.
Looking closely at the interpretation of this doctrine, though, reveals
that the constraints in fact rule out very few attempts at major
reform. The single-subject rule requires that every part of an
initiative be “functionally related in furtherance of a common

95. CAL. OP. INDEX, supra note 4, at 3.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Jack Citrin, Iris Hui & Thad Kousser, A Taste for Reform, Presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association (Apr. 1–3, 2010).
99. See Kogan, supra note 32, at 5.
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underlying purpose.” 100 Studies show that the application of this rule
depends as much on political circumstances as on the objective
breadth of an initiative. 101 Further, the single-subject rule has not
kept off the ballot multi-pronged reform attempts such as 2006’s
Proposition 89, which would have provided public funding for state
candidate races at the same time that it brought a new regulatory
regime to initiative-campaign finance. 102
Amendments should not make a “far-reaching change in our
governmental framework,” 103 such a privilege is ostensibly reserved
to revisions. But the furthest-reaching changes to California’s
constitution made in the past generation have both resulted from
ICAs and survived challenges on the grounds that they constituted
revisions. Proposition 13—which in 1978 changed property tax rates
and assessment mechanisms, increased the legislative voting
threshold for state tax increases and the popular voting threshold for
local tax increases, ultimately realigning the fiscal relationship
between state and local governments—was upheld as an
amendment. 104 In 1990, Proposition 140 imposed legislative term
limits and slashed the legislative staffing budget, radically shifting
the balance of power from the legislative branch to the executive
branch but surviving a legal challenge on the grounds that it was a
revision. 105 More recently, the California Supreme Court initially
upheld Proposition 8’s ban on same sex-marriage by ruling that it

100. Brosnahan v. Eu, 641 P.2d 200, 204 (Cal. 1982) (quoting Schmitz v. Younger, 577 P.2d
652, 656 (Cal. 1978) (Manuel, J., dissenting)) (noting that the California Supreme Court has
adopted Justice Manuel’s dissenting approach).
101. John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the Single Subject
Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J. 399 (2010) (presenting a recent empirical analysis showing that the
partisan affiliation of judges appears to affect the likelihood that they will uphold initiatives
against single-subject challenges). For a discussion of how this rule has been applied in
California, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30
UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983). See also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject
Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35 (2002) (presenting a national study that compares the discretionary use
of the single-subject rule to a rule that was proposed and rejected at the federal constitutional
convention that would have allowed judges to nullify congressional acts that they disagreed with).
102. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7,
2006: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 8, 82–89 (2006) available at
http://vote2006.sos.ca.gov/voterguide/pdf/ English.pdf.
103. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990).
104. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281
(Cal. 1978).
105. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991).
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was an amendment rather than a revision. 106 One possible read of
judicial doctrine in its recent application is that the revision doctrine
may constrain the breadth of constitutional change, disallowing
reforms that change many aspects of the state’s governing apparatus
while allowing deep, reverberating changes that alter only one area
of government.
B. Warring Reforms Can Distort Each Other’s Effects
Perhaps a more pressing problem for the project of piecemeal
reform is that the lack of coordination between approaches to
reforms prevents individual amendments from acting in concert.
Separate amendments can bring disjointed or even antagonistic
changes. Reforms pushed by disparate, often-warring authors can
work at cross purposes, distorting each other’s effects. The 2010
battle of redistricting initiatives is the most obvious example, 107 but
not the first. Even amendments proposed by allied forces can interact
in unpredictable ways.
During the 1979 tax revolt, Howard Jarvis’s Proposition 13 was
closely followed by the “Gann Limit” on expenditures of tax
revenues. 108 Jarvis and Gann were allied political entrepreneurs, but
Jarvis’s initiative so drastically reduced the state’s tax revenues that
Gann’s spending limit became virtually a dead letter that had the
primary effect of pushing the state to raise more in fees. 109
The campaign finance changes brought about by Proposition 34
in 2000 have made it easier for parties—rather than candidates—to
raise political funds. This may have created a weapon that party
organizations can use to play a greater role in determining their
standard bearers now that the 2010 “top-two” primary amendment,
which gives parties great incentives to clear the field for one
106. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
107. See Daniel Lowenstein, Viewpoints: Time to Broaden Redistricting Reforms? No,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 2, 2010, at 13A; supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. But see
David Pacheco, Viewpoints: Time to Broaden Redistricting Reforms? Yes, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 2, 2010, at 13A.
108. ARTHUR B. LAFFER ET AL., RICH STATES, POOR STATES: ALEC-LAFFER STATE
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX 73–74 (2d ed. 2009).
109. See Thad Kousser et al., For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure
Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, 8 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 331, 351 (2008); Thad Kousser et
al., When Does the Ballot Box Limit the Budget? Politics and Spending Limits in California,
Colorado, Utah, and Washington, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TO BUDGET POLICY 290–91 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008).
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candidate, has passed. When one political change goes into effect, it
alters the environment that another reform is intended to affect. This
interaction can reshape the impact of multiple reforms. Cross-state
comparisons have shown that legislative term limits have a much
different impact on states with professional legislatures, such as
California, than they have on citizen statehouses. 110 Because there
have been recent calls both to alter California’s term-limit law and to
turn the legislature into a citizen body, 111 it is important to consider
the complex interactions between these piecemeal reforms.
C. The Catch-22 of Financing Reform
Interest groups qualify piecemeal reforms for the ballot, rather
than the reforms being placed on the ballot by a convention or
commission that in some way represents the state. These interest
groups often turn to direct democracy because the legislature would
not pass their proposals, and their proposals reach the ballot because
the groups have the resources to fund professional signaturegathering campaigns. This means that the types of proposals that
become the substance of the piecemeal process will be qualitatively
different from the types of reforms that emerge from the convention
and revision processes. It also means that reforms promising benefits
for a narrow group have a better chance at qualifying for the ballot as
ICAs than as reform attempts with broader constituent bases. Since
voters are not fools, the flip side of this advantage is that narrowinterest initiatives, once qualified, have a lower chance of ultimate
passage. Overall, this reduces the chances that the ICA process will
produce reform results. The fate of Repair California’s attempt to
uses two ICAs to call a constitutional convention illustrates this
challenge.

110. Farmer & Green, supra note 67, at 1, 4–9 (discussing the results of a cross-state
comparison of legislative term limits where states are grouped by the level of legislative
professionalism). See generally Karl T. Kurtz et al., Introduction to INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: THE CASE OF TERM LIMITS 1, 3 (Karl T. Kurtz et al. eds., 2007) (“One of
our key findings . . . is that the impact of term limits . . . is greatly affected by two factors: the
degree of professionalism of the legislator and the restrictiveness of the term limit.”).
111. John Marelius, Critics Seek a Part-Time California Legislature, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Mar. 1, 2010, at A1; Anthony York, Term Limit Tweak May Be Heading Back to Ballot:
New Initiative Closely Resembles Failed 2008 Measure to Change Law, CAPITOL WKLY.
(Sacramento), Oct. 8, 2009, at A7.
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After 2009’s summer of love and hope for Repair California’s
constitutional convention idea turned into a fall troubled by
campaign logistics and then into a winter of discouraging failure,
Californians were reminded once again what a tough trick it is to
fund a reform campaign. There was no lack of enthusiasm for the
constitutional convention idea; thousands of supporters turned out at
town hall meetings across the state, newspapers editorialized about
the idea in glowing terms, and Governor Schwarzenegger rarely
missed a chance to voice his support for it. 112 Yet the harsh reality is
that none of this enthusiasm turned into cold hard cash to support a
signature-gathering effort.
This failure illustrates the catch-22 that reform groups always
face: it is hard to raise money for ballot measures that do not help
any narrow interest, but it is nearly impossible to obtain broad
support for measures that appear to provide a special benefit. The
first part of this dilemma is easy to read from the story of Repair
California. Holding a constitutional convention, with all of the
uncertainty about what might emerge from it, did not clearly align
with the interests of any major political camp, industry, or
benefactor. Support may have been a mile wide, but it was only an
inch deep among the groups that could write the six- and sevenfigure checks necessary to fund a serious campaign.
The second part of the dilemma can be seen in recent cases of
reform propositions that made it to the ballot but failed to win a
majority vote because they appeared too tilted toward their
benefactors’ interests. Proposition 89, the California Nurses
Association’s 2006 initiative for “clean money” and directdemocracy campaign finance reform, provided comprehensive
campaign finance changes. 113 The initiative also included a few
provisions that clearly benefited unions and could help the nurses

112. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Wrong Fix for California, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A27
(discussing the positive response of the state’s major newspapers to the question of a
constitutional convention); Skelton, supra note 6 (“Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger says he
‘absolutely’ loves the idea of holding a constitutional convention to overhaul state government.”);
Press Release, Repair Cal., Government Reform Coalition Submits Measures to Call California
Constitutional Convention (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/
oct_28_repair_california_press_release.pdf (discussing attendance at town hall meetings).
113. See Dan Morain, Prop. 89 Takes on Election Funding, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at
B1.
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push for single-payer healthcare reform, a long-time policy goal. 114
As laudable as those goals may have been, changing the rules to
benefit a special-interest group did not appear fair to voters, who
rejected the proposition handily. 115 In 2008, Assembly Speaker
Fabian Nunez and Senate leader Don Perata funded Proposition 93,
which would have changed term limits and, not coincidentally,
extended both Nunez’s and Perata’s careers. 116 Again, many strong
arguments could be made for this initiative, but the opposition only
needed to focus on these two scandal-plagued legislative leaders to
turn voters against the measure. 117
The path of piecemeal reform requires ICAs to overcome two
hurdles. The first, qualifying for the ballot, is steepest for broadbased reforms that lack specific patrons. The second, obtaining
majority support on election day, is hard for any measure that, no
matter how much good it might do for the state, promises even
greater benefits for the narrow group that placed it on the ballot.
Together, these obstacles have doomed many attempts at
constitutional change.
D. Narrow Victories for Amendments Change
Constitutions on a Knife’s Edge
Of course, some reform measures have succeeded, though often
by strikingly narrow margins. In recent years, a remarkable number
of major reforms have passed or failed by a knife’s edge in a state
that now has 37 million residents: 118
• 2010’s Proposition 14, the top-two primary, won by
398,287 votes 119
114. Id.
115. Pros & Cons—In Depth: Ballot Measure: California Fair Elections Act, LEAGUE OF
WOMEN
VOTERS
OF
CAL.,
http://www.cavotes.org/vote/election/2010/february/16/
ballot-measure/political-reform-act-1974-california-fair-elections-ac/more (last visited Nov. 13,
2010) (discussing the failure of Prop 89, with 74 percent of California constituents voting no on
the measure).
116. Op-Ed., Corruption of a Good Idea, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2008, at B6.
117. Jim Boren, Passive-Aggressive Lawmakers Just Play to the Crowd, FRESNO BEE,
Feb. 10, 2008, at J3.
118. See Harris, supra note 3, at 3.
119. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: JUNE 8, 2010, STATEWIDE DIRECT
PRIMARY ELECTION 19 (2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2010-primary/pdf/19-votes-for-against.pdf (noting there were 2,868,945 votes for Prop 14 and
2,470,658 votes against).
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• 2008’s Proposition 11, setting up a redistricting
commission, won by 197,378 votes 120
• 2008’s Proposition 93, which would have amended term
limits, lost by 613,360 votes 121
• 1990’s Proposition 140, which instituted term limits, won
by 311,781 votes 122
These close outcomes for major constitutional changes raise the
question of whether there should be any limits on the changes that a
simple majority can make to state government, especially in lowerturnout primary elections. Though the decisions on the constitutional
amendments listed above reflect the preferences of the median voter,
they each left a very large minority of voters unhappy. This is
especially troubling given evidence that members of racial and ethnic
minorities sometimes end up on the losing end of direct democracy
elections. 123 Of course, this is a hazard of all majoritarian decision
processes. In the case of California constitutional reform, though,
three arguments can be made against passing piecemeal reforms on a
knife’s edge.
First, when a constitutional amendment wins by a narrow
majority, the election does not signal that the winning reform is the
median voter’s ideal governing structure; it merely shows that the
median voter prefers it to the constitutional provision that existed
before the election. The amendment’s proponents only have to beat
the status quo, giving them outsized agenda-setting power in return
for the resources that they spent to qualify for the ballot. 124 This is a
particular problem for piecemeal initiative reform because the
process does not allow for amendment. At a constitutional
convention, in a revision commission, or on the floor of the
legislature, moderate representatives could offer changes to bring the

120. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION
7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/7_votes_for_
against.pdf.
121. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: FEBRUARY 5, 2008, PRESIDENTIAL
PRIMARY ELECTION 13 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_primary/
13_votes_for_against.pdf.
122. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 6, 1990,
at 9 (1990), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1990-general/1990-general-sov.pdf.
123. See Zoltan Hajnal et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California
Ballot Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154 (2002).
124. See Romer & Rosenthal, supra note 51, at 28.
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ultimate constitutional proposal closer to what the median voter
wants. Lacking this process of give and take, piecemeal reform
allows the amendment’s sponsors to craft one-sided measures that
will succeed as long as they can narrowly defeat the status quo.
Second, simple-majority vote rules that allow would-be
reformers to ignore wide swaths of the electorate raise the specter of
allowing the winners in an electoral system to write the rules of the
game for their further benefit. This is a particular danger in a state,
like California, where constitutional amendments may be passed in
primary elections or even special elections, such as those held in
2003 and 2005, that have especially low turnout, 125 It might be
possible to pass ICAs that put up obstacles to political participation,
such as voter identification laws, with a narrow majority in a lowturnout election. The manipulation of electoral rules for the benefit
of a temporary majority has a long history in American politics. 126
Third, it presents an illogical asymmetry that California’s
constitution requires supermajorities to make so many decisions, but
a simple majority can amend it. With two-thirds votes in the
legislature required to pass a budget or to raise taxes, and
supermajority popular votes required to pass many local taxes and
bonds, amending the state constitution is one of the easier tasks in
California politics. It is often noted that 1978’s Proposition 13
imposed some of these super-majoritarian provisions, when the ICA
itself fell short of two-thirds supermajority support, winning with
64.8 percent of the vote in the primary (and thus lower-turnout)
election. 127 To many voters, this asymmetry does not make sense.
When the Poll asked whether a two-thirds popular vote should be
required to amend the constitution, 56 percent favored this change
and only 36 percent opposed it, with voters of all party stripes
supporting it at equal rates. 128
125. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, OCTOBER 7, 2003:
STATEMENT OF VOTE, at xiii (2003), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2003_special/sum.pdf; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, SPECIAL STATEWIDE ELECTION, NOVEMBER 8,
2005: SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE (2005), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/sov/2005_special/ssov/ssov_summary_pg_1.pdf.
126. See Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Anti-Fusion
Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287 (1980); Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to Win
the Game: The Middle Class Regimes of Municipal Reformers, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 691, 697–99
(1999).
127. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
128. CAL. OP. INDEX, supra note 4, at 5.
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V. CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
California’s current path of constitutional reform—a meandering
medley of disparate amendments pushed by a fractious set of authors
rather than a comprehensive project of revision—may be surprising
given the magnitude of the state’s governing crisis. But it should not
be surprising that we are on a piecemeal path given California’s
constitutional history and the records of other states. University of
California, Berkeley, political scientist Bruce Cain subtitled his
review of California’s constitutional change as follows: “The
Triumph of Amendment over Revision.” 129 This is the way that the
Golden State muddles through reform with today’s approach a
microcosm of our long-standing tradition.
If piecemeal reform is our political reality, how can this
common tool be used best? I conclude by advocating an approach
that draws on the strengths and combats the characteristic
weaknesses of piecemeal reform: reformers should assemble a series
of bipartisan “reform logrolls” that each tackles a single subject.
Each logroll would combine something that left-leaning voters desire
with a reform in the same area preferred by the right. The logrolls
could be proposed in sequence, allowing reformers, voters, and
scholars to carefully consider the impact of shifts in one area before
moving on to fix the next area, thereby making Brandeis’s
experimental theory a reality. Reforms would be put before voters
one at a time, avoiding the electoral vulnerability that harmed many
omnibus comprehensive constitutional changes. Like other
piecemeal reforms, these amendments would also avoid opening the
Pandora’s box of divisive social debates.
This approach picks up many of the advantages of piecemeal
reform and simultaneously avoids its drawbacks. Because each
logroll would contain two provisions focused on a single area of
government, the piecemeal reforms would avoid single-subject
challenges and most likely be safe against revision challenges. If
legislators or groups like California Forward assembled the
bipartisan deals, the reforms would not distort each other’s effects

129. See Bruce E. Cain, Constitutional Revision in California: The Triumph of Amendment
Over Revision in State, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 60 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds.
2006).
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because they would be planned and drafted in concert. This approach
would get around the catch-22 of financing reform. The narrower
interests represented by both sides would put up the initial funds, and
when measures qualified for the ballot, their bipartisan nature would
give them broad appeal. The authors of such reforms would still face
the challenge of putting together nonintersecting coalitions to back
their initiatives. They would have to compromise to succeed at the
ballot box. This would compel them to assemble coalitions like the
one that pushed Proposition 1A’s revisions to overwhelming victory
in 1966 130 and thus avoid making major changes on knife’s edge.
Concrete examples of reforms that have the potential to fit this mold
include the following:
• A majority-vote logroll that would eliminate the two-thirds
requirement to pass a state budget in exchange for
abolishing the legislative leadership’s control over the
“Suspense File,” which stops bills that might win majority
support from ever reaching the floor of the legislature. The
first part of this deal would ensure that the party that wins a
legislative majority can shape the state’s spending plan
while the second part would give the minority an equal
voice in the legislative process by allowing their bills to
pass or fail on their merits. 131
• A logroll that reduces legislative term limits—the total
length of time for which legislators can serve—from
fourteen to twelve years but allows legislators to serve all
of their time in one house or the other as long as voters
keep electing them. An ICA that would enact this change
has qualified to appear on the next statewide ballot after
November2010, with the petition drive funded by a
coalition of Los Angeles business and labor groups. 132
130. KOUSSER, supra note 39, at 13.
131. For a more detailed explanation of the Suspense File and its link to majority rule in
California, see Thad Kousser, What Democrats Must Give Up to Restore True Majority Rule to
California’s Legislature, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y Article 8 (2010), http://www.bepress.com/cjpp/
vol2/iss3/8/, and Gary W. Cox et al., Party Power or Preferences? Quasi-Experimental Evidence
from the American States, 72 J. POL., 799, 799–811 (2010).
132. In the February 2008 election, voters rejected Proposition 93, which was similar except
that it would have applied retroactively to current sitting officeholders, allowing some of them to
serve for more than twelve years. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 119. The new ballot measure
avoids this electorally devastating conflict of interest because it does not apply to any current
legislators.
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• A logroll requiring that ballot measures, whether they
mandate new programs or cut taxes, pay for themselves.
Many propositions include politically popular provisions
but do not provide a clear source of funding for the new
programs or tax cuts that they create. A reform designed to
combat fiscal irresponsibility on both the left and the right
would require any measure that seeks to increase spending
or cut revenues to identify a source—either spending cuts
or revenue increases—to pay for itself. A constitutional
amendment to require this, Senate Constitutional
Amendment 14, 133 was introduced during the 2009–2010
legislative session, but it stalled awaiting a vote on the
senate floor. In the Poll, 75 percent of surveyed voters
supported this proposal, with support coming evenly from
Democrats, Republicans, and independents. 134
By themselves, none of these changes would resolve
California’s constitutional challenges. Piecemeal reforms never do.
But a sustained project of coordinated, incremental reforms that
assemble broad coalitions in support of their limited aims appears to
be the most promising path to reform in California.

133. Reforms Headed to the Ballot in November, CALIFORNIACHOICES.ORG,
http://californiachoices.org/reforms-headed-to-the-ballot-in-november (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
134. See CAL. OP. INDEX, supra note 4, at 5.

602

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:569

